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1. Introduction 
 
Realisms Interlinked is a sublime work.  It reanimates theoretical philosophy with a distinctive 
synthesis of ideas and methods drawn from the commonsense metaphysics, epistemology, 
philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language of classical India (mainly via the  Nyāya 
school) and 20th century analytic philosophy (mainly via Strawson).  In pursuing this agenda, 
the book lights up a new possible future for the study of world and mind, rooted in a 
borderless history of philosophy that should hopefully be better known among coming 
generations of analytic philosophers.  Partly for this reason, it provides a refreshing contrast 
to other recent metaphysical and meta-metaphysical atlases like Sider (2011), Chalmers 
(2012), Thomasson (2014), Hofweber (2016), and Bennett (2017).  It deserves to be read 
alongside these works; while Chakrabarti doesn’t discuss them and they don’t discuss him, a 
conversation between the traditions would, I’ll suggest, prove illuminating. 
 Before turning to a discussion of some key ideas in this wide-ranging book, let’s 
consider its overall shape.  Although Chakrabarti is a realist, the primary goal of the book is 
to defend certain realism-links, which he first explored in his 1992 ‘I Touch What I Saw’ 
(which reappears as the first chapter).  These links are neutral on the status of realism, 
serving instead to constrain one’s overall set of commitments, leading to consistent realism 
or anti-realism.  Hence the book could have been given the clunkier title ‘(Anti-)Realisms 
Interlinked’.  But while that alternative title would have better conveyed the primary goal, it 
would have failed to signpost the aims of many chapters, which are often friendlier to 
realism, and consistently opposed to subjective idealism.  For besides defending 
metaphysical linking theses in chapters 1-2, 7, 16, and 24, the book also supports key tenets 
of Naiyāyika and Strawsonian epistemology, and critically discusses non-realist classical 
Indian schools (especially Buddhism and Advaita Vedānta) and anti-realist British 
philosophers (especially Dummett).  This current in the book includes chapters defending 
the outer-sense perceivability of properties (ch.3) and the inner-sense perceivability of self 
and mental states (chs.12-14), a chapter opposing dream-based arguments for idealism 
(ch.8), chapters defending testimony as a basic source of knowledge (ch.19) and non-
inferential knowledge of other minds (ch.17), a chapter containing an approving discussion 
of ‘Idealist Refutations of Idealism’ (ch.6), and a chapter opposing Dummettian semantic 
claims from the case of our understanding of future-tense sentences (ch.23).  The book also 
features chapters friendly to Nyāya’s more surprising realist commitments, including realism 
about absences (ch.25). 
 Bearing its primary and secondary goals in mind, the book can be read as favouring 
an integrated realist approach, in two stages.  Once the metaphysical chapters give us the 
realism-links, the epistemological chapters support using these links to move from one 
realism to another, by clearing space for non-inferential knowledge of various parts of the 
common-sense world (including properties, self, and other minds).  Once aware of some part 
of reality (as commonsense epistemology permits), we can gain support for others via the 
realism-links and consolidate on a sweeping realist picture through the link-contributed 
coherence.  In this way, realist light dawns gradually over the more neutral metaphysical 
core of the book.  We might reason from realism about self to realism about world (with 
objects, properties, and a primitive tie of inherence), to realism about other selves, and 
perhaps even to realism about God (ch.24) and absences (ch.25).  
Or so it may seem.  But the undertones of the book are not unequivocally realist.  
Chakrabarti hints at the end that once common sense discloses the known world, what we 
mainly find is that the ‘world of ordinary objects and conventional truth is left un-denied as an 
object of non-attached double denial’, so that one ‘denies the denial of the world of ordinary 
experience’ (292).  Upon reaching this stage, one achieves a ‘wonderful lightness’, and can 
shake off a desire for either ‘world-affirmation or world-denial’ (292), and hence decline to fly 
the flag for either realism or anti-realism.   
This conclusion—a contented anti-anti-realism—is also available to a sophisticated 
non-realist or objective idealist, as Chakrabarti allows in discussing transcendental idealism 
and Advaita non-realism (p.75), despite his more Moorean tone elsewhere.  This ambivalent 
side of the book could have been signposted more.  It raises questions.  If the most important 
links we get are between different applications of anti-anti-realism, one might expect cracks 
to appear once we consider possible links between different strengths of realism.  Hence the 
book may be compatible with a more fragmented metaphysics than it seemed intended to 
support.   
With that theme in mind, here is the plan for the rest of the review.  In §2, I consider 
what Chakrabarti takes realism to require at different points, mention some distinctions 
between strengths of realism that seem underacknowledged, and argue that the realism-
links are only strong if the linked realisms are weak; here I focus on aspects of chapters 1-2, 
5-7, 21-23, and 25.  I then note in §3 that there are different linking relations that should be 
more explicitly distinguished.  I argue that the book gives insufficient reason to forge the 
strongest link between the realisms it considers.  Here I describe some more fragmented 
outlooks (mixing realism of one kind with anti-realism of another) that seem consistent with 
Chakrabarti’s arguments, but conflict with Naiyāika-Strawsonian (meta-)metaphysics.   
 
2. Grades of Realism and Some Subsurface Fragmentation 
 
Part I defends the book’s core realism-links: (a) realism about the self is linked to realism 
about objects, (b) realism about subjects and objects is linked to realism about universals, 
and (c) these realisms are also linked to realism about inherence, the primitive tie of Naiyāika 
metaphysics.  How are these realisms linked, and what does ‘realism’ involve in each case?  
I doubt that we should accept a uniform answer.  If so, some significant disunity may outlast 
Chakrabarti’s arguments.   
 To uncover this disunity, let’s consider what realism and the links involve in each 
case, starting with objects and the subject-object realism-link.  In the setup on pp.10-11, 
realism about objects is understood minimally, as a view that involves denying that objects 
are nothing over and above collections of experiences or qualities.  So, following 
Chakrabarti’s presentation on p.11, realism about apples requires holding that they are (A) 
distinct from experiences of apples, (B) distinct from their qualities, (C) re-identifiable over 
time and across sense-modalities, and (D) intersubjectively identifiable.  Realism about the 
self is understood on p.11 as a related set of claims.   
But Chakrabarti elsewhere strengthens this characterization, without enough support.  
For example, revealing his allegiance to the Nyāya school, he says that we must accept 
‘dualism, that is, a full-fledged realism about substantial selves and material bodies’ if we 
reject bundle theories (8).  This is a starker choice than the choice between (A-D)-realism 
and its negation.  A one-world transcendental idealist or Advaitin non-realist could hold (A-
D)-realism while rejecting dualism.  The chapter’s focus on the debate between Buddhist 
phenomenalism and Nyāya realism makes the discussion feel biased toward heavyweight 
realism.  Consider how, when the foregrounded opponent is the Buddhist, Chakrabarti draws 
support from Frege, whose objects included third-realm entities about which objective 
idealism may be defensible (see Resnik (1979) and Sluga (1980)), and also from Kant’s 
refutation of subjective idealism.  Yet Chakrabarti here takes realism about self and world to 
exclude transcendental idealism and non-dualism.   For objects and subjects to be real 
according to Nyāya, it isn’t enough for there to be objective truths about them—not if 
‘objective’ could merely mean intersubjectively valid and truth is minimalist truth (or if truth 
here can be modelled by superassertibility (Wright (1992)).   
To understand the significance of this point for the dialectic, we can compare ideas in 
recent meta-ethics.  Normative non-naturalism can be framed to require substantial truth-
makers (e.g., Platonic reason-relations), but it can also dispense with substantial truth-
makers, detaching objectivity from correspondence truth.  These are different outlooks, as 
Parfit (2017) and Skorupski (2011) emphasize.  Mimicking them, we might say that it is 
objectively true that there are selves and particulars, not just bundles of experiences or 
qualities, but remain unsure about whether the objectivity of this truth is explicable in the way 
‘kneejerk’ realists like Sider (2011: 18) prefer.  Hofweber (2016)’s and Thomasson (2014)’s 
metametaphysics may support this kind of line.    
More concerningly for the realism-links, we might uphold heavyweight realism for 
objects but minimalist realism for subjects.  This view is not excluded by ch.1.  And it 
receives support, I think, toward the end of the discussion of self-reference in ch.11 and in 
the discussion of other minds in chs.17-18.  Consider how Chakrabarti approvingly discusses 
Abhinavagupta’s non-objectifying view of knowers (selves and others), writing that ‘[The ‘I’] 
exists, objectively, that is for all of us, but not as an object.’  The link between self and other 
minds in chs.17-18, together with the non-objectifying treatment of other minds in ch.18, 
further supports adopting different kinds of realism about objects and other minds, at least if 
‘objects’ can be fully known in an objectifying way.  Given a consistent view of self and other 
minds, that suggests treating the self differently from objects.  One might take this view 
about God too (who enters in ch.24).    
Let’s now consider some related observations about the discussion of universals and 
inherence.  Chakrabarti links realism about subjects and objects with realism about 
universals in ch.2.  I agree that, minimally understood, realism about one rationally requires 
realism about the other.  But must we accept the same strength of realism about both?  It 
seems coherent to be a heavyweight realist about objects but a minimalist realist or 
transcendental idealist about universals, considered apart from that in which they inhere.  
Indeed, the argument Chakrabarti uses to support this link only seems designed to exclude 
reductions of universals to sets of particulars.  One can reject this reduction while taking a 
more minimalist view about universals (e.g., a ‘pleonastic’ view (cf. Schiffer (2005)) or 
transcendental idealist view).  Another fragmented view would treat universals as less 
fundamental than thick particulars, or as ‘abstractions’ in Armstrong (1997)’s sense from 
other non-repeatable entities (e.g., events or states of affairs).  Here one might consider a 
hylomorphic view that treats substances as basic, with universals and bare particulars 
viewed as abstractions from substances (as form and matter respectively), thus getting what 
Armstrong called the ‘victory of particularity’.  
Of course, like Armstrong, one might hold these views while resisting any ‘anti-realist’ 
billing.  But it seems coherent, even promising, to combine objective idealism about the 
world’s form with heavyweight realism about its matter.  This view is untouched by ch.2’s 
arguments.   
 Related points arise with the next link, to inherence (ch.7).  If we regard states of 
affairs as fundamental, we might view inherence as an abstraction, like universals and thin 
particulars.  We might go farther, treating universals and inherence as having a different 
status from particulars while remaining within the Nyāya framework.  As Phillips (1997: 50) 
notes, Udayana recognizes three grades of reality, with substances, qualities, and motions 
coming first, universals and inherence occupying a middle sphere, having being (bhāvatva) 
but not existence (sattā), and absences lying in an outer circle, amounting only to something 
which is real in the sense of being a padārtha (a nameable).  If we took states of affairs to 
obtain wherever inherence relations obtain, the depiction of Nyāya metaphysical structure in 
Ganeri (2001: Ch.3) would provide a window onto a more Armstrongian view, which treated 
the nodes in the network of inherence and the network itself as an abstraction from the 
structured whole of the world.  Important differences in ontological status may remain, then, 
if we accept links between the minimal forms of realism.  
 Let’s take stock before considering some final thoughts.  The foregoing discussion 
suggests that different strengths of realism might be appropriate to different subject matters, 
and that the only realism that holds in all cases will be minimal.  A corollary is that one may 
legitimately incline more toward anti-realism in some cases (self, universals, and inherence) 
than in others (objects or states of affairs).  If our bugbear is the subjective idealist, we might 
correctly say we are ‘realists’ across the board.  But different bugbears may loom for 
different subject matters.  Objective idealism may fit with commonsense when applied to 
alleged third-realm entities like propositions (where Chakrabarti resists realism (see p.18 and 
p.222)).  It is, however, contrary to commonsense when applied to concrete objects.  
Commonsense hence seems not to be uniformly realist.  Chakrabarti partly agrees: he is not 
a realist about third-realm entities.  But there can coherently be more gradations than he 
believes.   
 Now, Chakrabarti does at different points give weaker and stronger characterizations 
of realism.  At least six characterizations of realism appear:  
 
(1) a minimal characterization as the negation of subjective idealism plus the view 
that there are ungrasped truths about the world (ch.1),  
 
(2) a Dummett-style semantic characterization (p.26), which Chakrabarti later rejects 
(ch.23),  
 
(3) a characterization requiring irreducibility (p.266),  
 
(4) a characterization that entails the negation of objective idealism (ch.6),  
 
(5) a characterization like the Lewisian understanding in terms of naturalness, 
suggested by a discussion of ‘universal blockers’ in Nyāya as disqualifiers of full-
blooded realism about some abundant properties (see p.30), and  
 
(6) an implicit characterization on p.274 of realism as opposing all the anti-realist 
views discussed there, which include mere skepticism (following Kant, 
Chakrabarti counts this as ‘problematic idealism’).   
 
It would have helped to get these distinctions up front, with some stock-taking of whether a 
given realism-link is supposed to hold for every strength of realism, or just some strength 
(p.284).   
Although six characterizations might sound like plenty, others need attention.  Ideas 
from the meta-metaphysical turn matter here.  One might combine the first-order realism that 
Chakrabarti favors with something less than full-blooded meta-metaphysical realism.  We 
could agree that objects, subjects, universals, inherence, and even absences and God exist, 
while opting for what Hofweber calls an internalist reading of ‘exist’ in some cases.  Or one 
might take all these things to exist, regarding existence questions as easy, but hold that 
some are more fundamental than others.  Ganeri (2001)’s graph-theoretic portrayal could 
help in sorting out degrees of fundamentality: those entities that inhere in nothing 
(substances) could be treated as absolutely fundamental, qualities and parts less 
fundamental, and universals even less fundamental.   
 The basic observation is that when more distinctions are drawn, there is a risk to the 
significance of the linking project.  Suppose we should only be lightweight realists about 
universals and selves.  There must then be a thinning of the links: robust realism about 
objects will not entail a correspondingly robust realism about universals.  To get a whole 
network of links, we may hence need to invoke very weak forms of realism.  In the meta-
metaphysical age, this weakening reduces the interest of the links: the hard questions in 
metaphysics are not about the truth of ‘realism’ understood so minimally. 
 
3. Types of Linking Relation: More Subsurface Fragmentation 
 
There is a further problem to discuss, which is that it is not obvious that the same linking 
relation is supported at all stages in the book.  The strongest link is mutual entailment.  But 
some of Chakrabarti’s arguments don’t establish this link.  Defending this link between even 
weak forms of realism sometimes depends on questionable epistemological and 
methodological assumptions.  Since a version of this point already appears in the literature 
(see Ganeri (2000) and Chadha and Nichols (2020) responding to Chakrabarti (1992)), I will 
be briefer with it.   
Two kinds of links receive support in the book, though Chakrabarti assumes that they 
converge, given his epistemology and philosophical methodology.  To see the first, weaker 
link, consider Chakrabarti’s first kind of argument.  In chs.1-2, we get arguments from the 
unity of experience for the necessity of positing subjects, objects, and universals.  
Chakrabarti summarizes the idea as follows: 
 
Both realisms derive support from the plain fact of perceptual re-identification of 
objects across times and senses.  In the face of that fact, realism about a persistent 
substantial self would turn out to be inconsistent with anti-realism about external 
physical objects.  (9) 
 
The argument resembles the Kantian thought that the unity of experience requires an ‘I’ to 
do the unifying, though Chakrabarti goes beyond Kant in regarding subjects as substantial.  
Since the unity of experience partly consists in our stable awareness of objects, the facts of 
experience support belief in objects only if they also support belief in subjects.  We get a 
different but related argument for the converse claim: to experience an objective time-order 
that could sustain one’s psychological continuity, there must appear to be a stable world 
from one’s perspective.   
The link that is most directly supported by these arguments is the following: 
 
Rationality Link: Experience rationalizes belief in objects iff it rationalizes belief in 
subjects. 
 
As Chakrabarti also nicely puts it:  
 
[A] realist conception of material objects over and above their properties and 
independent of experience of them compels us to believe in the existence of 
substantial selves.  (14; my italics).   
 
Hence these arguments are not directly arguments for: 
 
Reality Link: Objects are real iff subjects are real.   
 
Yet Chakrabarti makes stronger claims: 
 
Selves over and above experiences are real if and only if objects over and above 
experiences are real. (10).   
 
If one is a realist about objects, taking external things that many of us perceive 
directly to be independent of our perceptions, then, this book argues, one is logically 
committed to being a realist about subjects, selves as enduring substances owning 
mental states. (3) 
 
Consider also, for example, the relation between realism about inherence and realism about 
the world: 
 
Realism about the world logically entails and crucially requires realism about 
inherence. (77) 
 
These claims matter for the overall linking project, which does not merely defend relations of 
mutual rational requirement between beliefs in different forms of realism.     
 How does Chakrabarti get the stronger claim for subjects and objects?  Ganeri (2000: 
646) suggests he gets it through a fallacy.  I think, however, that the argument is more 
complex than it appears.  First, Chakrabarti has independent arguments for the reality of 
selves (ch.16), and so takes himself to have sufficient independent reason to believe in 
selves, which gives reason to believe in objects via the Rationality Link.  Secondly, 
Chakrabarti assumes that assertibility and rational belief go together: ‘To assert the existence 
of entities of a type is to pragmatically imply that the asserter knows that some things of that 
type exist and also knows what type he is referring to’ and hence it is ‘incoherent to add to 
the minimal existence-claim the strongly agnostic claim that all those recognition-
transcendently existing things of type M might turn out to be…not of the type we know and 
refer to as M-type at all’ (24).  Finally, Chakrabarti has a commonsense epistemology that 
entitles us to take experience at face value, barring defeaters.  Hence, if experience supports 
one realism iff it supports the other (per the Rationality Link), and we take experience at face 
value, one might think realism about subjects and objects will stand together. 
 There is, however, a problem with this case for the stronger claim.  Experience only 
provides defeasible reason for taking its content at face value.  There could be defeaters for 
rational belief in some objects that are not defeaters for belief in subjects.  For example, one 
might worry that common-sense realism about ordinary objects could be undermined by 
debunking arguments from the dependence of intuitions about object persistence and 
composition on folk teleology (compare Kovacs (2021)).  Yet even if it were undermined, 
experience would retain the requisite unity, and unity-based arguments would continue to 
support the self.  To accept such arguments, we needn’t be realists about objects in any 
stronger way than believing that veridical experience has intentional objects that are not 
private.  So, one can take an ultima facie rational realist attitude about subjects but not 
ordinary objects. 
 Related concerns bedog the link with universals.  Consider this argument for the 
objects-universals realism-link: 
 
[I]f ordinary perceived particulars have to exist as the physical objects we often know 
them to be whether or not we can apprehend them correctly in detail on every 
occasion, they must have (or lack) some features objectively; that is whether the ones 
we identify as wooden tables are actually so or not, woodenness and tableness must 
be actually exemplifiable.  For a non-particular individual like tableness, 
exemplifiability is enough for existence.  Hence tableness has to exist independently 
of our awareness of it.  Since bare or propertyless particulars would not be the 
macroscopic objects of ordinary perception, a world devoid of such actual features 
like cowness and treeness would not be a world where cows and trees can exist 
unperceived.  (25) 
 
As Chakrabarti acknowledges in mentioning Nyāya’s commitment to ‘universal-blockers’ 
(pp.30; 57-58) and attitude toward ‘titular properties’ (p.22), there is not sufficient reason to 
be uniformly realistic about all the ‘features’ objects appear to have.  These blockers provide 
theoretical defeaters of the experience-given reason for robust realism about features.  Yet 
all that is necessary for objects to appear in experience, according to the foregoing 
argument, is that they are experienced as having some features, not that these features be 
genuine universals.   
If this is true, experience may provide undefeated support for objects without 
providing undefeated support for the universalhood of the features that objects appear to 
have.  Hence we can at most get links of the following kind for objects, subjects, and 
universals: 
 
Prima Facie Rationality Link: It is prima facie rational to believe in X’s reality iff it is 
prima facie rational to believe in Y’s reality. 
 
If different ‘blockers’ to X and Y can be drawn from metaphysics, then we do not get the 
relevant instance of: 
 
Ultima Facie Rationality Link: It is ultima facie rational to believe in X’s reality iff it is 
ultima facie rational to believe in Y’s reality.   
 
If we can’t assert this link, we also cannot assert the relevant instances of: 
 
 Reality Link Schema: X has reality iff Y has reality. 
 
To be sure, if we have default reason to take experience at face value, the burden is on the 
selective anti-realist to give selective defeaters.  But there is insufficient attention to 
defeaters in the book.  Most notably, the tension between the manifest image of descriptive 
metaphysics and the scientific image of many contemporary metaphysicians is neglected.  
The one discussion (pp.180-181) appears during a defence of folk psychology against 
fictionalism about the mental.  While Chakrabarti reasonably worries that this fictionalist view 
is self-undermining, there is no general parallel response to defeaters of folk metaphysics 
from the scientific image, like recent debunking arguments against folk mereology and 
commitment to substances.  More radical scientific challenges to descriptive metaphysics 
also needed attention; Chakrabarti’s claim that ‘[f]aithfulness to common linguistic usage is 
undeniably the starting point for all realists and descriptive metaphysicians’ overlooks, for 
example, Maudlin (2007)’s realist challenge to descriptive metaphysics.  Unchecked by 
science or theoretical virtues besides intuitive adequacy, descriptive metaphysics risks 





My discussion has been selective—inevitably so: the book condenses in twenty-five chapters 
decades of work in every area of theoretical philosophy.  My recommendation for anyone 
who has read this review is to get a copy of the book and read it right now.  It is a remarkable 
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